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Over half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas, increasing pres-
sure on city governments to implement sustainable and equitable growth strate-
gies.1 Now more than ever, urban sprawl rears its head in environmental, social, 
and fiscal issues, and local governments are on the frontlines.2 However, cities 
must balance the costs of urban growth against the benefits of adding new resi-
dents.3 Some local governments already implement policies to address urban 
growth, and there is much to learn from their endeavors.4 
Many cities embrace growth because it generates significant fiscal advantages 
for their jurisdiction.5 To attract new residents, local governments invest in revi-
talizing their downtown centers and update zoning to permit higher density hous-
ing.6 If governments successfully attract new residents, the city benefits in a va-
riety of ways: Primarily, increasing the number of residents expands a city’s tax 
base, freeing up more resources to invest in local infrastructure, schools, and 
public transportation.7 Increased populations can also attract new grocery stores 
and health care centers to areas that lack convenient access to fresh food or qual-
ity healthcare.8 Finally, increased housing density and improved public 
 
 1 Richard Florida, Just How Much of the World is Urban?, CITY LAB (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-06/how-urban-is-the-world-s-popula-
tion-experts-disagree. 
 2 What is Urban Sprawl?, CONSERVE ENERGY FUTURE, https://www.conserve-energy-fu-
ture.com/causes-and-effects-of-urban-sprawl.php (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
 3 See Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to 
Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 777 (2020) (comparing the benefits 
of gentrification against the costs of growth). 
 4 See, e.g., LUKE HERRINE ET AL., GENTRIFICATION RESPONSE: A SURVEY OF STRATEGIES 
TO MAINTAIN NEIGHBORHOOD ECONOMIC DIVERSITY 121–23 (2016) (discussing policy strate-
gies adopted by different cities across the United States). 
 5 See Robert W. Wassmer Marlon G. Boarnet, The Benefits of Growth 1 (Urban Land 
Inst., Working Paper, 2002) (discussing the fiscal benefits of growth). 
 6 Justin Graham, Comment, Playing “Fair” with Urban Redevelopment: A Defense of 
Gentrification Under the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Test, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1719, 
1735 (2013); see SMART GROWTH AMERICA, (RE)BUILDING DOWNTOWN: A GUIDEBOOK FOR 
REVITALIZATION 16–18 (2015), available at https://smartgrowthamerica.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/08/rebuilding-downtown-1.pdf (discussing examples of how local governments 
can attract new residents). 
 7 See Graham, supra note 6, at 1735, 1743 (discussing improved public services in con-
junction with growth of the tax base). 
 8 Joseph Gibbons et al., Evaluating Gentrification’s Relation to Neighborhood and City 
Health, 13(11) PLOS ONE 1, 2–3 (2018). 
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transportation can reduce local traffic, resulting in lower carbon emissions, less 
pollution, and better air quality.9  
Despite the many benefits of urban growth, progress comes at a cost.10 Eco-
nomic development projects can raise the local cost of living, which risks pricing 
out11 low-income residents.12 The most vulnerable residents live in areas labeled 
as “low-value,”13 “up and coming,” or “opportunity zones”:14 These labels are 
often used to describe “underserved” urban neighborhoods where real estate de-
velopers can buy cheap land and, in some cases, receive tax abatements for doing 
so.15 This type of property speculation often foreshadows the onset of new busi-
nesses and homes built to attract more wealthy residents.16 Once wealthier resi-
dents move into the revitalized neighborhood, businesses and property owners 
raise prices in response to increased demand for goods and housing in the area.17 
However, the increased cost of living pressures local, low-income residents to 
move away to more affordable neighborhoods.18   
The effects of speculative investment in urban neighborhoods highlight the 
racial, socioeconomic, 19  and cultural20 factors that complicate city revitalization. 
 
 9 Jeff Turrentine, When Public Transportation Leads to Gentrification, NRDC (June 1, 
2018), https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/when-public-transportation-leads-gentrification. 
 10 See Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3 (discussing the benefits and draw-
backs of gentrification). 
 11 Richard Florida, The Complicated Link Between Gentrification and Displacement, CITY 
LAB (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-08/the-complex-re-
lationship-between-gentrification-and-displacement. 
 12 See Ashley J. Qiang et al., Displacement and the Consequences of Gentrification 1, 2 
(Duke Univ., Working Paper, 2020), available at https://sites.duke.edu/wen-
wang/files/2020/01/Gentrification_and_Displacement_Working_Paper.pdf (discussing the 
connection between gentrification and increased costs of living on low-income incumbent res-
idents). 
 13 Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3. 
 14 Andrew Khouri, Can California Boost Home Building Without Super Charging Gen-
trification?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-housing-af-
fordability-gentrification-20190423-story.html (associating the “up and coming” label with 
the potential for gentrification); Jason Richardson et al., Shifting Neighborhoods: Gentrifica-
tion and Cultural Displacement in American Cities, NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL. (Mar. 
19, 2019), https://ncrc.org/gentrification/ (see the “Discussion & Conclusion” section). 
 15 William Fulton, Opportunity Zones: Gentrification on Steroids?, KINDER INST. FOR 
URB. RSCH. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/2019/02/20/opportunity-zones-
gentrification-steroids. 
 16 Gentrification Explained, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, https://www.urbandisplace-
ment.org/gentrification-explained (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (noting that gentrification can 
appear as “[r]eal estate speculation, with investors flipping properties for large profits, as well 
as high-end development, and landlords looking for higher-paying tenants”). 
 17 Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Literature Review” section). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Angela Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3. 
 20 Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Discussion and Review” section) (explaining the 
results of a study showing how gentrification causes cultural displacement). 
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These effects fall under the umbrella term “gentrification,” defined as “a process 
in which portions of cities are transformed from areas that service low-income 
populations towards spaces that, by servicing higher-income populations, gener-
ate more capital for investors.”21 Gentrification is also described as “the middle- 
and upper-class remake of the central city—not just a residential phenomenon, 
but one that affects commercial and retail areas as well.”22 
To successfully curb gentrification, stakeholders in the public and private sec-
tor must work together.23 Local governments are key to successful partnerships, 
as they contribute the force of law to anti-gentrification policies.24 Local repre-
sentatives should participate to ensure their constituencies’ interests are repre-
sented. Lawyers are also needed to design policies that will withstand legal chal-
lenge. In other words, public and private sector collaboration is essential to 
limiting gentrification’s negative effects. 
Major cities across the world experience gentrification25 and many enact pol-
icies to curb rapid development and prevent displacement of low-income resi-
dents.26 Atlanta, Georgia and Berlin, Germany specifically adopted promising 
tools to eliminate the negative effects of gentrification. While Atlanta and Ber-
lin’s governments have much to learn from each other, their differences also 





 21 Miles Walser, Putting the Brakes on Rent Increases: How the United States Could Im-
plement German Anti-Gentrification Laws Without Running Afoul of the Takings Clause, 36 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 186, 187 (2018) (citing PETER MOSKOWIT, HOW TO KILL A CITY: 
GENTRIFICATION, INEQUALITY, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD (2017); DAVID 
MADDEN & PETER MARCUSE, IN DEFENSE OF HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF CRISIS (2016)). 
 22 Diane K. Levy et al., In the Face of Gentrification: Case Studies of Local Efforts to 
Mitigate Displacement, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMTY. DEV. L. 238, 240 (2007). 
 23 Anne Marie Pippin, Note, Community Involvement in Brownfield Redevelopment 
Makes Cents: A Study of Brownfield Redevelopment Initiatives in the United States and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 592 (2009) (discussing New Jersey’s 
strategic choice to include various stakeholders in a redevelopment project); see also Angela 
Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3 (noting that gentrification is usually caused by the 
combined actions of public and private economic investment). 
 24 See, e.g., Mitchell Crispell, How’d They Do It? A Look at Three Places That Avoided 
Gentrification, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.urbandisplace-
ment.org/blog/how’d-they-do-it-look-three-places-avoided-gentrification (discussing cities 
which successfully slowed gentrification through laws instead of voluntary policies). 
 25 See, e.g., Anne B. Shlay & John Balzarini, Urban Sociology, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 926, 931 (James D. Wright et al., 2015); Wendie N. Choudary, 
Mitigating Gentrification; see also How Several Sun Belt Cities Are Responding, RICE KINDER 
INST. FOR URB. RES. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://kinder.rice.edu/2018/12/12/mitigating-gentrifica-
tion-how-several-sun-belt-cities-are-responding. 
 26 See, e.g., Herrine et al., supra note 4. 
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A. Displacement 
 
The core issue with gentrification is that it often displaces low-income origi-
nal27 residents.28 Displacement occurs when residents can no longer afford to live 
in their neighborhood because local development raises the cost of living.29 Dis-
placement disproportionately affects low-income residents, forcing them to leave 
behind support networks and community cultural capital.30 Gentrification often 
displaces low-income Black and Latinx families first, preventing many BIPOC 
residents from gleaning the economic benefits gentrification brings to their 
neighborhood.31 If cities allow gentrification to progress without restraint, gen-
trification will eventually displace both low-income and middle-class residents 
from urban cores, exacerbating socioeconomic and racial segregation within cit-
ies.32  
While a variety of factors cause displacement, they can be grouped into three 
main categories: direct, exclusionary, and pressure displacement.33 Direct dis-
placement occurs “when residents are forced to move because of rent increases 
and/or building renovations.”34 Exclusionary displacement happens when the in-
flux of wealthy residents reduces housing options for incumbent low-income 
families, forcing them to seek housing in different neighborhoods.35 Finally, dis-
placement pressures describe the challenges that low-income residents face 
“when supports and services that [they] rely on disappear from the neighbor-
hood.”36 The various causes of displacement highlight the need for policy solu-
tions which are broad enough to address the complex causes of displacement, yet 
effective enough to enact change. 
 
 
 27 In this paper, “original residents” refers to individuals who lived in an area pre-gentri-
fication. 
 28 Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Executive Summary” section). 
 29 Levy et al., supra note 22, at 240. 
 30 Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the 
Age of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189, 1189 (2016); see Richardson et al., 
supra note 14. 
 31 Richardson et al., supra note 14 (see “Executive Summary” section); Angela Harris & 
Aysha Pamukcu, supra note 3. 
 32 See Li, supra note 30, at 1192, 1199 (discussing the consequences of resegregation 
caused by gentrification). 
 33 Gentrification and Neighborhood Revitalization: What’s the Difference?, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Apr. 5, 2019), https://nlihc.org/resource/gentrification-and-neighbor-
hood-revitalization-whats-difference. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 




This topic merits legal attention because housing, tax, and land use laws are 
significant drivers of gentrification. To illustrate, state and local governments 
can encourage gentrification “through tax exemptions for large real-estate devel-
opments, providing necessary infrastructure and adjusting legal and planning 
regulations in accordance with the objectives of the real estate industry . . . .”37 
If laws can promote gentrification, they can also limit it.38 Therefore, public au-
thorities should promulgate laws that respect market forces and encourage eco-
nomic development, but also include protections for communities most vulnera-
ble to displacement.39  
 
II. ATLANTA AND BERLIN: ANTI-GENTRIFICATION MECHANISMS 
 
Two cities stand out in the fight against gentrification: Atlanta, Georgia and 
Berlin, Germany. Atlanta and Berlin exemplify two common ways local and state 
governments fight  gentrification, and their successes and failures offer important 
lessons. Commentators frequently cite Atlanta as an example of gentrification’s 
positive and negative effects.40 Atlanta’s gentrification problem exposes the 
city’s unique racial dynamics as white residents continue to buy up property in 
“a city historically described as a ‘black mecca.’”41 Atlanta’s government made 
the city distinctly vulnerable to gentrification when it tore down all of the city’s 
 
 37 Hisham Ashkar, The Role of Laws and Regulations in Shaping Gentrification, 22 CITY 
341, 343 (2018). 
 38 See id. at 342–43; see Sanda Feder, Stanford Professor’s Study Finds Gentrification 
Disproportionately Affects Minorities, STAN. NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://news.stan-
ford.edu/2020/12/01/gentrification-disproportionately-affects-minorities/ (proposing solu-
tions to gentrification in the form of residential stability policies for lower-income residents in 
gentrifying communities). 
 39 See How American Cities are Handling Neighborhood Change, Gentrification and Dis-
placement, RICE KINDER INST. FOR URB. RES. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://kinder.rice.edu/ur-
banedge/2019/09/23/how-american-cities-are-handling-neighborhood-change-gentrification-
and-displacement (highlighting strategies to prevent displacement). 
 40 See, e.g., Christopher Quinn, Atlanta Ranked Fourth-Fastest Gentrifying City in U.S., 
ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 19, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/atlanta-
ranked-fourth-fastest-gentrifying-city/E74wz9VxF5TxWcsUinKRmK/. 
 41 Jamiles Lartey, Nowhere for People to Go: Who Will Survive the Gentrification of At-
lanta?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/oct/23/nowhere-
for-people-to-go-who-will-survive-the-gentrification-of-atlanta. 
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public housing projects,42 leaving nearly all of “its housing subject to the invisi-
ble hand of market forces.”43 Berlin, on the other hand, has strong legal protec-
tions for low-income residents but still encourages beneficial economic develop-
ment.44 Like Atlanta, Berlin’s gentrification occurs within a unique historical 
context, as its economic development is closely tied to the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989.45 Atlanta and Berlin’s approach to curbing gentrification offers invalu-




Atlanta, Georgia is rapidly gentrifying.46 Between 2000 and 2017, Atlanta’s 
median rent increased by 70%, the median income increased by 48%, and the 
median home value increased by 46%.47 In 2019, a Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia study concluded that “Atlanta has the fourth largest share of gentri-
fying neighborhoods . . . .”48 Admittedly, Atlanta’s redevelopment projects bring 
substantial benefits to the city. Neighborhood revitalization projects generated 
higher property tax revenues,49 developers repurposed abandoned historic build-
ings,50 and Atlanta organizations commenced construction of the Beltline.51 
However, it is unclear whether the benefits conferred upon Atlanta outweigh the 
issues caused by the rapid increase in development.52 These revitalization 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Kate Connolly, ‘No Bling in the Hood . . .’ Does Berlin’s Anti-Gentrification Law Re-
ally Work?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/oct/04/does-
berlin-anti-gentrification-law-really-work-neukolln. 
 45 Elisabeth Zerofsky, The Causes and Consequences of Berlin’s Rapid Gentrification, 
NEW YORKER (July 12, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-causes-and-
consequences-of-berlins-rapid-gentrification. 
 46 See Lartey, supra note 41 (explaining that 46% of Atlanta’s census tracts are currently 
gentrifying); see also Quinn, supra note 40. 
 47 ONE ATLANTA: HOUSING AFFORDABILITY ACTION PLAN 1, 6 (2019), available at 
https://www.atlantaga.gov/home/showdocument?id=42220. 





 49 Graham, supra note 6, at 1734. 
 50 Josh Green, ‘Urban Reclamation’ meets Atlanta’s Old Fourth Ward, CURBED ATLANTA 
(Sept. 19, 2018, 10:17 AM), https://atlanta.curbed.com/atlanta-development/2018/9/19/ 
17861216/ponce-city-market-atlanta-old-fourth-ward. 
 51 Graham, supra note 6, at 1744–45; Lartey, supra note 41. 
 52 Mara Shalhoup, It’s the Best Time to be an Atlantan. It Might also be the Worst, 
ATLANTA MAG. (2020), https://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/its-the-best-
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projects attracted a wave of wealthy families to Atlanta, which in turn raised rents 
and property taxes beyond what many low-income Atlantans could afford.53 
To combat the negative externalities of gentrification, Atlanta implements a 
variety of legal strategies. First, the city works with the federal Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), to implement the Section 8 program.54 
The Section 8 program was created by the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Act).55 
This Act allows low-income families to use “vouchers” to pay for private hous-
ing;56 the government then “pays the landlord the difference between 30 percent 
of the household’s adjusted income and the unit’s rent.”57 The Section 8 program 
does not require landlords to accept vouchers, but does forbid landlords from 
charging the government a price higher than the fair market rate for the unit.58  
Section 8 programs can be administered in multiple ways,59 but Atlanta only 
uses Section 8 funding for its Moderate Rehabilitation Program (Mod Rehab).60 
Mod Rehab was created by amendment in 1978 and “expanded Section 8 rental 
assistance to projects that were in need of repairs costing at least $1,000 per unit 
to make the housing decent, safe, and sanitary.”61 HUD requires that Atlanta’s 
Mod Rebab program provides rental subsidies for “low and moderately low-in-
come individuals and families” who make below thirty percent of the Atlanta 
Area Median Income.62 However, the program does not fully alleviate gentrifi-
cation’s effect on affordable housing availability, as landlords in low-poverty 
areas are more likely to reject Section 8 vouchers than landlords in high-poverty 
 
time-to-be-an-atlantan-it-might-also-be-the-worst/ (arguing that the benefits of Atlanta revi-
talization projects are unequally distributed). 
 53 See Lartey, supra note 41 (discussing Cheryl Henderson’s story of rising rent costs in 
Atlanta, especially near the Beltline); see also Ernie Suggs, Atlanta’s Gentrification Wave 
Washes over Historic Old Fourth Ward, AJC (2019), https://www.ajc.com/business/econ-
omy/atlanta-gentrification-wave-washes-over-historic-old-fourth-
ward/667fp9edFYZOpE89QOwrTP/ (discussing ways that Ponce City Market affects local 
property taxes). 
 54 Section 8, CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/depart-
ments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-development/section-8 (last visited Sept. 
2, 2020). 
 55 Section 8 Rental Certificate Program, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/programd 
escription/cert8 (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id.; Glenn Thrush, With Market Hot, Landlords Slam the Door on Section 8 Tenants, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/us/politics/section-8-hous-
ing-vouchers-landlords.html. 
 59 CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32284, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING PROGRAMS: 
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 5 (2014). 
 60 Section 8, supra note 54. 
 61 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32284, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING 
PROGRAMS: HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 4–5 
(2014). 
 62 Section 8, supra note 54. 
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areas.63 If a family wants to secure affordable housing in a gentrifying neighbor-
hood, it can thus be difficult to find landlords who will accept their vouchers.64 
The program’s effectiveness is also limited because the federal government 
stopped funding new projects in 1989.65  
Atlanta also partners with HUD to “provide[] financing for low-income rental 
housing within the Atlanta City limits.”66 The program utilizes funds made avail-
able through the federal Home Investment Partnership Program (HOME) by 
providing low-interest loans to developers who build low-income rental hous-
ing.67 The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 author-
ized the HOME program.68 The Act ensured “that every American family [can] 
afford a decent home in a suitable environment.”69 The Act requires HUD to 
strengthen the federal government’s partnership with public and private institu-
tions that can provide “housing affordable to low-income and moderate-income 
families.”70 However, the program is subject to similar limitations as Atlanta’s 
Section 8 program: Developers are unlikely to participate in the program if build-
ing luxury housing will be more profitable than accepting public funds.71  
In addition to the Mod Rehab and HOME Program, Atlanta acted under the 
federal Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) and the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) to create the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP).72 HERA provides funds for local 
 
 63 See Sonam Vashi, Atlanta’s Section 8 Tenants Have Trouble Finding Good Housing, 
SAPORTA REP. (Jan. 7, 2019, 6:10 PM), https://saportareport.com/atlantas-section-8-tenants-
have-trouble-finding-good-housing/ (describing the challenges Atlanta residents face in find-
ing landlords who will accept Section 8 vouchers). 
 64 See id. 
 65 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32284, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING 
PROGRAMS: HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 4–5 
(2014). 
 66 Multifamily Housing Program, CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/govern-
ment/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-development/multifamily-
housing-program (last visited Aug. 30, 2020). 
 67 Id. 
 68 CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 40118, AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOME INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 
PROGRAM 1 (2014). 
 69 42 U.S.C.A. § 12701 (West 1990). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Teresa Wiltz, Getting a Section 8 Voucher Is Hard. Finding a Landlord Willing to 
Accept It Is Harder, PEW (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analy-
sis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/31/getting-a-section-8-voucher-is-hard-finding-a-landlord-will-
ing-to-accept-it-is-harder (“The goal of the Section 8 program is to give low-income families 
the opportunity to escape high-poverty neighborhoods. Nevertheless, most voucher recipients 
fail to do so, in large part because the HUD vouchers aren’t enough to cover the rents in higher-
income neighborhoods.”); see also Vashi, supra note 63 (illustrating difficulties Section 8 ten-
ants have in finding landlords to accept their vouchers). 
 72 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 1 (NSP1), CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.at-
lantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-
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governments to “purchase and redevelop foreclosed properties” to create more 
housing for low-income residents or fund other activities that benefit low- and 
moderate-income residents.73 The Dodd-Frank Act requires cities to use their 
funds to stabilize and develop housing in areas hit hardest by the 2008 reces-
sion.74 The Act also requires that at least twenty-five percent of the funds be 
spent on stable housing for households below fifty percent of the Atlanta Area 
Median Income.75 Atlanta’s NSP utilizes funds from HERA and the Dodd-Frank 
Act “to acquire and redevelop abandoned or foreclosed properties that might oth-
erwise become sources of . . . blight.”76   
To supplement its federally funded programs, Atlanta enacted a variety of lo-
cal laws to curb gentrification. In 2018, Atlanta adopted an Inclusionary Zoning 
(IZ) ordinance;77 the IZ ordinance aims to “promote affordable housing for At-
lantans who live and work in the City of Atlanta and is designed to keep Atlanta 
rents relatively affordable for working individuals and households within the in-
come range of police, firefighters, teachers, City and County employees, and 
young professionals.”78 The IZ ordinance applies to “all new multifamily rental 
developments, whether standalone or mixed-used multi-unit buildings, with at 
least 10 units” located within a rapidly gentrifying Atlanta neighborhood.79 Each 
developer in the area has the option to set aside ten to fifteen percent of their 
units for moderate- to low-income renters or to pay a one-time “opt out” fee to 
be “used for developing, rehabilitating, and/or reconstructing additional afford-
able housing units.”80 While some celebrate the IZ ordinance for making anti-
gentrification efforts mandatory, others criticize the ordinance as chilling devel-
opment in Atlanta.81 However, the City of Atlanta’s 2020 study found that the 
ordinance did not cause a decline in requests for multi-family development 
 
development/neighborhood-stabilization-program-nsp/neighborhood-stabilization-program 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2020); Neighborhood Stabilization Program 3 (NSP3), CITY OF ATLANTA, 
GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-
community-development/neighborhood-stabilization-program-nsp/neighborhood-stabiliza-
tion-program-825 (last visited Sept. 4, 2020). 
 73 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 1 (NSP1), supra note 72. 
 74 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 3 (NSP3), supra note 72. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlan-
taga.gov/government/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-develop-
ment/neighborhood-stabilization-program-nsp/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2020). 
 77 Inclusionary Zoning Policy, CITY ATLANTA, GA, https://www.atlantaga.gov/govern-
ment/departments/city-planning/office-of-housing-community-development/inclusionary-
zoning-policy (last visited Sept. 4, 2020). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Stephannie Stokes, A Year In, Atlanta’s Inclusionary Zoning Does Little for Affordable 
Housing, WABE (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.wabe.org/a-year-in-atlantas-inclusionary-zon-
ing-does-little-for-affordable-housing/. 
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permits in Atlanta.82 In fact, there was a 68% increase in multifamily building 
permits issued after Atlanta adopted the ordinance.83 Most importantly, the ordi-
nance led to the construction of 362 new affordable units for low-income families 
between 2018–2020.84 
Atlanta also utilizes land use laws to incentivize developers to provide afford-
able housing.85 To illustrate, the Georgia Legislature authorized Atlanta to pass 
the Atlanta Urban Enterprise Zone Act (the UEZ Act) in 1983.86 The UEZ Act 
empowers Atlanta to designate economically depressed areas that have high 
speculative value as Urban Enterprise Zones (UEZ).87 Atlanta offers developers 
of UEZ housing properties a ten-year tax abatement if they dedicate 20% of new 
units for affordable housing and implement additional measures to prevent dis-
placement of low-income residents.88 As of 2018, Atlanta’s fifteen UEZ proper-
ties had created 539 affordable units for residents who fall below 60% of the 
Atlanta Median Income.89 
Despite the UEZ program’s relative success, some advocates believe that At-
lanta needs to expand the size of UEZ’s to effectively prevent displacement.90 A 
study by the Housing Justice League and Research Action Cooperative con-
cluded that Atlanta’s UEZ program is underused by developers and that the de-
mand for affordable housing far exceeds what is available in UEZ develop-
ments.91 For example, a 2015 city planning document predicted that Atlanta 
would gain 15,700 new housing units between 2015 and 2017, but only 2,800 of 
those units would be affordable.92 As of 2017, Atlanta still had over 32,000 res-
idents on the waiting list for public housing.93 In sum, although Atlanta 
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space.com/static/59da49b712abd904963589b6/t/59dedb75f7e0ab47a08224b5/15077774245
92/Beltlining+Report+-+HJL+and+RA+Oct+9.pdf. 
 91 Id. at 20. 
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implements promising tools to curb displacement, data suggests that the city 




Gentrification in Berlin tells a different story. When the Berlin Wall fell in 
1989, the German government began selling off property in East Berlin.95 The 
government’s efforts successfully revitalized the economically depressed East, 
as new owners converted derelict properties into clubs and art galleries.96 East 
Berlin eventually “became the hip part of town with cultural capital that attracted 
young professionals with financial capital, and its gentrification radiated . . .  
slowly outward.”97 However, the sale of East Berlin real estate triggered more 
economic development than Berliners could have imagined.98  With limited 
housing supply and rapidly increasing demand, Berlin’s home purchase prices 
increased by 70% between 2009 and 2014.99  
Berlin’s housing policies also caused a steep increase in rent prices.100 Since 
2000, the city cut all government-sponsored subsidies for building and property 
renovations.101 Subsequently, Berlin’s building activities significantly decreased 
while population and housing demand continued to grow.102 In addition to cut-
ting subsidies, Berlin sold half of its public housing to alleviate pressure on the 
city budget.103 Berlin’s gentrification thus quickly progressed from positive eco-
nomic development to triggering a dramatic increase in housing costs.104  
Since 2004, Berlin’s property prices more than doubled; between 2009 and 
2014, property prices rose by 70%.105 In 2017 alone, property prices increased 
by 20.5%.106 Over that span of five years, rents rose 56%.107 Berlin residents, 
outraged that their government let gentrification spiral out of control, regularly 
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your profit!”). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Andrej Holm, Berlin’s Gentrification Mainstream, in THE BERLIN READER: A 
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 101 Id. at 174. 
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took to the streets in protest.108 Many residents joined grassroots movements, 
arguing that affordable rent is a birthright.109  
In response to citizens’ demands, the Berlin government adopted a number of 
laws to curb gentrification. Berlin’s government is authorized to take positive 
action against gentrification because the German Constitution (the Basic Law) 
governs the country as a Sozialstaat (social welfare state).110 As a social welfare 
state, “it is not enough to protect citizens from [harm] . . . the government must 
also affirmatively promote the public good . . . [and] create legislation that ac-
tively promotes the public good.”111 In the context of displacement caused by 
gentrification, the Basic Law places an affirmative duty on Berlin’s government 
to provide “state aid in order to ensure a [basic] subsistence level. This is where 
[Germany’s] social housing policy finds its origins and legitimization.”112  
Article 14 and Article 20 of the Basic Law require the Berlin legislature to 
balance the right to adequate housing113 against landowners’ right to control their 
property.114 Article 14 mandates that the right to property is not absolute and 
“[i]ts use shall also serve the public good.”115 In combination with Article 20’s 
mandate that the State must “ensure the provision of adequate housing for the 
population,” the Basic Law lays the legal foundation upon which the Berlin gov-
ernment can regulate property.116 The Basic Law also mandates that constitu-
tional courts “review whether lawmakers have adequately considered and 
weighed the right to property against the principles of human dignity, personal-
ity, and equality along with the principles of proportionality, rule of law, and the 
 
 108 E.g., Erik Kirschbaum, Gentrification Is Changing Berlin. Officials Are Banning Rent 
Hikes for 5 Years, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-
germany-berlin-rent-increases-outlawed-20190620-story.html. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Walser, supra note 21, at 189–90. 
 111 Id. at 190. 
 112 See JULIA CORNELIUS & JOANNA RZEZNIK, NATIONAL REPORT FOR GERMANY 1, 40 
(n.d.), available at http://www.iut.nu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/National-Report-for-Ger-
many.pdf (discussing the German Federal Constitutional Court’s defining “subsistence” as 
“cover[ing] the need to secure physical existence, thus the accommodation”). 
 113 CONTRIBUTION BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO THE REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING 1, 3 (n.d.), available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/sub-nationalgovernments/Germany.pdf 
(describing the right to adequate housing under German law). 
 114 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 14, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-inter-
net.de/english_gg/index/html. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Fabian Thiel, “Property Entails Obligations”: Land and Property Law in Germany – 
Past, Present, and Future, 1 EUR. ASIAN J. L. COM. 75, 82 (2011) (discussing Article 14); 
CONTRIBUTION BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO THE REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING, supra note 113 (discussing Article 20). 
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social welfare state.”117 Germany has thus created various legislative, judicial, 
and administrative mechanisms to empower governments to balance the right to 
own and profit off property against the right to adequate and affordable housing. 
As authorized by Article 14 and Article 20,118 the Berlin government imple-
mented a number of  laws to combat gentrification.119 First, Berlin adopted a law 
called the Mietpreisbremse;120 the law acts as “a rental brake that regulates how 
steeply property owners can increase rents” and prevents residential landlords in 
designated areas from increasing rent beyond 10% of the typical rental rate for 
five years.121 Mietpreisbremse includes an escape hatch by exempting leases for 
new housing which was completed after October 1, 2014 and for the first lease 
term of homes having undergone substantial renovations.122 
The Mietpreisbremse is subject to numerous criticisms.123 Some residents crit-
icize the law for its loopholes, specifically that “the tenant is only eligible for a 
refund on their overpaid rent from the date of their first complaint, not from the 
date they first began paying an illegally high rent.”124 Because Berlin’s housing 
supply is so limited, many tenants are not willing to incur the cost of suing their 
landlord and others would rather pay a price premium than have to find alterna-
tive housing.125 Finally, despite the Basic Law’s mandate that German legisla-
tures must balance the right to property against considerations of human rights 
and equity, German courts have issued conflicting rulings on the constitutionality 
of the Mietpreisbremse law.126 
In addition to the Mietpreisbremse, Berlin passed the Milieuschutz laws; these 
laws “require owners to obtain special permission before renovating rental prop-
erties or converting them into owner-occupied condominiums.”127 These laws 
aim to prevent renter displacement by regulating the pace of development in up-
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and-coming neighborhoods.128 The Milieuschutz laws allow renters to financially 
prepare for increased rents because prices will increase more predictably and at 
a slower rate.129 However, the Milieuschutz laws are also subject to criticism, 
primarily from tenants who claim that the “toothless” Milieuschutz laws lack ef-
fective enforcement mechanisms, allowing many landlords to escape liability.130 
In October 2019, the Berlin government adopted a law freezing all rents at a 
prescribed rate between June 2019 and June 2022 and imposed a cap on all rental 
rates.131 The cap provides an absolute rent limit and a reference point for rent 
reductions.132 Notably, the Senate of Berlin included exemptions for “newly con-
structed buildings that were ready for occupancy on or after 1 January 2014, 
publicly subsidized apartments as well as dormitories and apartments operated 
by recognised welfare organisations.”133 Due to accusations made by Mie-
tendeckel’s opposers, implementation is currently stalled while the German fed-
eral government and courts determine the constitutionality of the Mietendeckel 
laws.134 Thus, the Mietendeckel’s effectiveness has yet to be determined.135 
 
III. ATLANTA VERSUS BERLIN 
 
Atlanta and Berlin utilize different legal mechanisms to fight displacement of 
racially and socioeconomically marginalized populations.136 Berlin takes a more 
punitive approach to limiting gentrification.137 Atlanta relies more so on devel-
oper and landlord tax incentives.138 However, each city has much to learn from 
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one another. This Note proposes ways that Atlanta can adopt anti-gentrification 
policies similar to Berlin’s, and vice-versa, to more effectively curb displacement 
caused by gentrification. 
The main difference between Atlanta and Berlin’s approach to displacement 
lies in Berlin’s restrictive and punitive anti-gentrification laws.139 Berlin enforces 
its laws by imposing heavy fines.140 Atlanta could benefit from adopting a more 
punitive approach because developers are unlikely to opt into incentives pro-
grams when they could make more profits on the open housing market.141 Even 
with Inclusionary Zoning, one of Atlanta’s mandatory programs, developers can 
avoid liability by paying a one-time fee into an affordable housing trust fund.142 
In reality, market forces and potential for profit risk outweighing incentives to 
preserve affordable housing in Atlanta’s new developments.143 For these reasons, 
Atlanta’s current policies have yet to slow gentrification’s momentum and pre-
vent displacement of low-income Atlantans.144 
However, one must consider barriers the City of Atlanta would face in imple-
menting Berlin’s mandatory and punitive laws. To begin, the United States is not 
a social welfare state.145 The German Constitution, on the other hand, recognizes 
the individual as part of a larger community and requires the German government 
“to look after its citizens and intervene in the market and social order if required 
to maintain equality.”146 The German and United States governments approach 
property regulation from fundamentally different legal frameworks, which af-
fects the tools each can use to curb gentrification.147  
Unlike Germany’s Basic Law, the U.S. Constitution does not require individ-
uals to use their property for the public good;148 if anything, the Constitution 
strictly protects the right to use, buy, or sell property to further the owner’s indi-
vidual benefit.149 The Constitution only allows the government to regulate 
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property without compensating the owner if necessary to protect public health, 
welfare, safety, and morals and if it would not deprive the owner of all econom-
ically viable use of their property.150 
The United States’ absolute commitment to negative rights limits local gov-
ernments’ ability to regulate exploding real estate markets.151 To resolve this is-
sue, United States courts could adjust their interpretation of negative rights in the 
context of housing and property rights. Adjustments are necessary because  the 
difference between negative and positive government action becomes much 
more ambiguous when applied to affordable housing policies.152 To illustrate, a 
government’s refusal to adopt constitutional rent controls or other anti-gentrifi-
cation laws may be a positive action within itself.153 Government inaction argu-
ably protects the property rights of speculators and those who can pay inflated 
property prices.154 Government inaction fails to protect—and may even violate—
the rights of those who are forced to give up their property because they can no 
longer afford to live in gentrifying areas.155 In sum, gentrification complicates 
the application of negative liberties and property rights in the United States. If 
federal courts refuse to adjust traditional interpretations of negative property 
rights, state and local governments will need to design anti-gentrification laws 
that can withstand constitutional challenge.   
Georgia state law also restrains Atlanta’s anti-gentrification efforts.156 Cur-
rently, Atlanta cannot implement Berlin’s laws or anything similar because rent 
control laws are illegal in Georgia.157 Thus, Atlanta can only utilize incentive-
based programs and weaker zoning laws to enact change. However, many of 
these programs do not sufficiently appeal to developers’ self-interests.158 
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Fortunately, Georgia’s rent control ban is not insurmountable. Some advocates 
argue that the Atlanta government should request the law’s repeal or petition the 
legislature to waive the law’s applicability to Atlanta.159 Even if the legislature 
placed strict limitations on the degree to which Atlanta could restrict rents, rent 
controls would still preserve stable housing for many low-income residents.160 
Alternatively, Atlanta could control rents by passing a temporary rental rate 
freeze. While this would still likely require permission of the legislature, the tem-
porary freeze could slow gentrification long enough for the city to restructure its 
anti-displacement programs. 
Berlin, on the other hand, could also benefit from adopting parts of Atlanta’s 
anti-gentrification mechanisms. The Berlin government fails to consistently en-
force its rent control laws, which reduces incentives for compliance;161 if en-
forcement is unlikely, landlords may find it worth the risk to renovate housing 
and raise rent prices. To combat gaps in enforcement, Berlin should take a page 
from Atlanta’s book by offering incentives that capitalize on developer and land-
lords’ self-interest and that encourage compliance with the Mietpreisbremse and 
Milieuschutz laws. The German Constitutional already authorizes the govern-
ment to take positive action to ensure citizens have adequate housing.162 Under 
this grant of authority, Berlin could guarantee significant tax breaks to develop-
ers who set aside a certain percentage of their units for affordable housing or 





While gentrification generates significant benefits for cities, its negative ex-
ternalities cannot be justified. Displacement has unacceptable cultural, social, 
and health effects:163 It prevents low-income families from accessing “educa-
tional and employment opportunities” and pushes affordable housing into areas 
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with polluted environments and scarce healthcare resources.164 Thus, it is imper-
ative that local, state, and federal governments collaborate to implement equita-
ble and effective legal mechanisms to curb gentrification. 
Gentrification cannot be solved by simply passing the right laws or adopting 
the right incentives. Surrounding Atlanta and Berlin’s fight against gentrification 
is the larger question of what role the government plays in regulating interactions 
between the haves and have-nots, the rich and the poor, the marginalized and the 
celebrated.165 How can and should governments, regardless of social-welfare or 
capitalistic orientations, actively protect property rights of low-income citizens? 
Should this power instead be entrusted to non-governmental groups? Should 
low-income Americans be empowered to demand economic justice, and not just 
bureaucratic mercy?166 Regardless of who leads the battle against gentrification, 
government support is essential.167 Thus, Atlanta and Berlin must rise to the chal-
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